Trinity College

Trinity College Digital Repository
Senior Theses and Projects

Student Scholarship

Spring 2012

Mexico's Quest in the North American Markets
Antonio Diaz Gonzalez Salas
Trinity College, antonio.diazgonzalezsalas@trincoll.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, International Economics Commons,
Labor Economics Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons

Recommended Citation
Diaz Gonzalez Salas, Antonio, "Mexico's Quest in the North American Markets". Senior Theses, Trinity
College, Hartford, CT 2012.
Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/187

Mexico’s Quest in the North American
Markets

By Antonio Diaz Gonzalez Salas

Submitted to the International Studies Program,
Trinity College

Supervised by Miguel Ramirez

May/ 2/ 2012

0

Abstract:
Since the 1980s Mexico has implemented various economic policies that have
improved its financial system at times. All the policies have ultimately failed. Since the
1990s both Mexico and China have made progress in foreign trade with their respective
trade organizations. Mexico entered the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994 and China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In
spite of being a part of two different trade organizations, both countries had a
significant increase on their GDP and consequently a change of focus and direction
towards their internal investments to enhance their production of exports.
Unfortunately, these two counties have recently experienced frequent overlapping of
their exports; which has increased the competition between the two countries. This
thesis examines the possibilities and procedures that Mexico, along with its NAFTA
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partners, must follow in order to evade the economic harm generated by the rise of the
Chinese economy.
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Introduction:
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The desire for economic development and stability has led countries to opt for
specific financial policies to maximize output and gain advantages over other countries.
Even though the Mexican government believes they have made the necessary changes
in their international economic policy to be at the forefront of their potential, Mexico,
along with its NAFTA partners, has not yet implemented strategies that give priority to
trading among themselves without losing investment to other markets such as China.
Moreover, Mexico should take advantage of its place in North America and use it as
one of their economic strengths against Chinese competition. Therefore Mexico must
focus on specializing in the goods that can be produced with good quality and at a
faster rate. If Mexico fails to effectively implement policies that can set them apart from
Chinese production, the Mexican economy will be harmed tremendously in the coming
years since China and Mexico often find themselves producing similar type of goods.
Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that Mexico changes and improves its economic
infrastructure in several sectors of the economy.
This thesis examines the economic and historical factors that have led Mexico to
choose and adopt economic policies since the international debt crisis and the peso
crisis. Most of the economic policies that Mexico has implemented since the 1980’s have
failed due to the lack of policy planning, failure to spread the wealth among the entire
population, corruption on behalf of the Mexican government, and erroneous choices
that will be analyzed throughout this paper.
4

Mexico’s economic performance before the 1980s is addressed in chapter one.
The second chapter examines the two Mexican economic crises- the peso crises of 1976
and the economic debt crisis of the early ‘80s. Finally the third chapter is an in depth
analysis of NAFTA, its strengths and weaknesses, its future, and an analysis of
opportunities it should take. It is important for us to examine the economic policies
implemented in the past to be able to learn from them and make changes for the future.
Currently Mexico is facing the competition of China, which has been referred to as the
“red demon” by several economists. China is quickly gaining territory on the same
exporting products and markets around the globe, specifically in the U.S. markets. This
increases the competition for Mexican producers tremendously and has clearly harmed
their markets. Therefore Mexico, along with its NAFTA partners, must now act to
change the direction in which their economies are heading and reorganize their
infrastructure.

5

Chapter 1:
Import Substitution industrialization.
From the 1940s to the 1970s Mexico enjoyed rapid economic growth as a result of
the strategy known as import substitution industrialization (often called ISI). This
economic policy was implemented in many Latin American countries with the intention
of generating local development by producing and consuming internal products. In
other words, the intention was to create a self-sufficient economy with a local market
and one that is less dependent on foreigners. This highly protectionist economic policy
was supposed to transform Latin American countries from a rural economy to a more
industrial economy. Nevertheless, this economic policy did not work favorably for the
Latin American countries. For those countries with larger populations, such as Brazil
and México, it worked for a little longer given that they were politically more stable and
had a larger internal market. Their geographic location and population worked to their
advantage in the creation of an internal market. The ISI worked for a shorter period or
did not work at all those countries with a smaller population and a lack of resources, or
political instability, since they were unable to create a strong local market.
6

Scholars have argued that although the ISI policies implemented in Mexico were
“largely responsible for the economic miracle of the 1960’s, they also laid the
groundwork for the high rates of borrowing capital flight on the 1970s.”1 As mentioned
before, the political stability in Mexico was vital for the functioning of ISI policies.
President Avila Camacho (1940-1946) was one of the initiators of the idea of promoting
the expansion of the economic base of the country in many sectors of the country. The
aim was to create employment and rapid economic growth, but mainly to improve the
standard of living via the local production and consumption of goods.

Why did ISI work for Mexico in the beginning?

The “financing of the ISI was initially facilitated by high wartime demand in the
United States for Mexican mineral exports such as zinc, copper, lead, mercury and
cadmium.”2 Profits were made on materials such as petroleum and rubber since they
were also supplied by Mexico to the allied forces. Secondly, the bracero program was
implemented in 1942 which allowed Mexican workers to work in the United States
temporarily. This was an agreement made by the United States President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the Mexican president Manuel Avila Camacho. World War II created a
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Ramírez, 42
Ramirez, 43
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massive labor shortage in many sectors of the United States economy, especially in the
agricultural sector. A third important step implemented by the Avila Camacho
government was to support the creation of a development bank and industrial
entrepreneurship. Therefore the expansion of NAFINSA (Nacional Financiera, Sociedad
Anonima) in the 1940s played an indispensible role. This organization was created by
the federal government in 1936 with the purpose of founding a financial society that
grants capital to Mexican banks to restore liquidity and promote industry. It
participated in the creation of firms and industries, offering training and technical
assistance, specially financing the emergence of mid-size companies. For example “it
loaned and invested from 85.4 million pesos in 1942 to 1,228.7 million pesos by the end
of 1947.”3 Evidence of this is the establishment of Altos Hornos de Mexico. This is a steel
mill founded in 1942 located in the north of Mexico in the state of Coahuila. Local
engineers and bankers had the idea of building this industrial unit, nevertheless they
did not have the economic resources and the machinery needed. NAFINSA participated
in projects like these. According to Ramirez, in order “to secure the necessary financing,
NAFINSA negotiated a loan with the U.S. Export-Import Bank for $6 million.” 4 Next,
the development bank played a crucial role in acquiring the necessary machinery and
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equipment” purchasing them or obtaining them by donations mainly from the United
States.

Why ISI failed to live up to its expectations.

During the Avila Camacho administration the country’s “real GDP increased at
an average yearly rate of 6.2 percent, while per capita product increased at an
impressive 3.3 percent.”5 All the sectors of the economy registered growth rates and,
more importantly, total and public investment more than tripled from the 1940s to 1952.
Nevertheless, this was based on a captive market designed by the government’s
protectionist policies, a situation that brought as a consequence the development of
firms without a solid competitiveness relative to other countries. There was a lack of
development in the exporting sector of Mexico, which led to further stagnation of
economic growth. This condition did not allow a truly independent and modern
industrialization that could have contributed to Mexican economic development in the
following years.
Presidents Avila Camacho and Miguel Aleman opted to “raise the rate of capital
formation in the private sector through increases in the real profits of that sector. This

5
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meant that increases in wages had to lag well behind increases in prices.”6 Another
reason for wage reduction was the increasing migration of rural laborers to the urban
sector, which was unable to absorb job seekers. The excess supply of labor in the urban
sector contributed to the wage reduction. By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s there
was a lack of productivity and an uneven growth of the agricultural and urban sectors.
The country’s exports declined relative to its imports as compared to previous years.
This is what Raul Prebisch, the secretary-general of the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) at the time, described as the deterioration of the terms of trade
between the industrial and the rural sectors. This situation accelerated “inflation
accompanied by growing current accounts imbalances, and an increasing reliance on
foreign funds to finance the country’s external and internal deficits.”7 The
interconnectedness of these problems is the main reason for the political, social and
economic instability that eventually caused an economic crisis in the late 1970s.

Chapter 2:

6
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The economic crisis
By 1972 president Luis Echeverria faced a critical situation in which the economic
and social future of Mexico hung in the balance. The President had two options: either
to continue to promote industrialization or begin to redistribute the country growing
wealth.
The Echeverria administration decided to do both at the expense of
monetary and financial
stability; it embarked upon a populist program
designed to raise the state’s provision of collective consumption goods, such
as subsidized health and housing, and to accelerate the process of import
substitution in the capital goods sector.8
With the first action the Echeverria administration was attempting to reduce the
social tensions that had arisen as a consequence of the government’s poor performance.
The second action was aimed at generating rapid economic growth, profits, and jobs,
while reestablishing the confidence of the private sector. To accomplish these goals the
Echeverria administration implemented two policies. One was to increase government
spending and the second one was to postpone necessary tax reforms at the time. These
polices did not work as expected. From the beginning of the implementation of these
policies until 1976, the public sector deficit as well as the money supply had at least
tripled. Inflation also quadrupled during the same period.9 You need to cite other
sources besides Ramirez to support your claims.
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By the end of Echeverria’s governance the economic situation had worsened,
inflation increased while real GDP declined. This caused many local and foreign
investors to lose confidence in the peso which led to capital flight to the United States to
place their wealth in a more stable economy. According to Mexican economist Solis, the
growing uncertainty among private investors caused Mexico around 4 billion pesos in
investment to flee the country in 1976.10

The IMF in Mexico and why its policies failed.

President Lopez Portillo established an agreement with the International
Monetary Fund promising to reduce the public deficit, decrease the money supply and
public investment, begin trade agreements with other countries, and limit the amount
of labor compensations.
The IMF has provided financial capital and designed programs for economic
recovery in many countries. According to Pastor, the Fund has the right to advice
countries experiencing economic difficulties on how to strategically stabilize their
economies and generate economic recovery. On the other hand, the IMF also has the
power to obstruct crucial financing that can potentially come from other private
creditors. Despite this power, Peru and Jamaica tried to obtain payments directly from
10
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private creditors in the 1970s. “Although these were ultimately unsuccessful, the fact
that countries even attempted to reject the Fund’s financing and advice in favor of
private credit and stabilization programs indicated a general weakening of the Fund’s
institutional power.”11 The debt crisis came in the 1980s and soon three-quarters of Latin
American countries were operating under some IMF stabilization program that was
accompanied by a high degree of conditionality.
The Latin American countries were responsible for meeting the goals laid out in
the stabilization programs in order to receive help from the Fund. The Fund would also
withhold credit to problem debtors unless there was a fresh influx of capital from the
bankers as well. By setting these harsh conditions the IMF had a monopoly over lending
in Latin America and used its power to determine the economic policies of Latin
America. The Fund maintained a “case by case approach that blamed the crisis on
various domestic mistakes and maintained separated negotiations between itself and
individual countries.”12
Some of the economic policies that the IMF recommended for the Latin American
countries were a devaluation of the currency, a reduction of the fiscal deficit, a decrease
in real wages, and a relaxation in the terms of trade by reducing tariffs and subsidies to
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make exports more attractive to foreigners. All these policies were problematic. For
instance, since all these policies were recommended to all Latin American countries, if
every country devalued its currency at the same time, then no one would gain an
advantage over the other. That is, the growth rate of their exports would simply
decrease. Also, at the time these policies were implemented, the world economy was in
recession and foreign countries did not have the income to buy goods from the
countries which devalued their currencies. Lowering domestic wages decreased the
demand for domestic goods and since foreigners and domestic consumers had little or
no income to purchase products, the Latin economy as a whole was hurt.
In the case of Mexico, the IMF forced the country to decrease its rate of inflation.
Therefore, the Mexican government decided to reduce wages so that the rate of growth
of the money supply could be reduced. These actions by the government came too little
too late and in 1978 home and car prices increased alarmingly.
Rising inflation and external debt are the two main reasons why the IMF
program did not work in Mexico. First of all, as the government was trying to pay its
external debt through the profits generated from the new found oil reserves, it
undermined the poor sector of its population. The government fixed nominal wages for
unskilled labor while there was extreme inflation in the country. The poor were slowly
forgotten, and there were price increases for everything even the most common foods
for this part of the population. The cost of the tortilla and the bolillo (a certain kind of
14

bread that many construction workers eat) more than doubled in price. Gas and
domestic gas also doubled in price. During this period the gap between the rich and the
poor widened extremely as Mexico did not restrict its domestic investors from sending
their money overseas. Secondly, the Mexican government, with the oil market boom
made a bad effort diversifying its exports. It could have used its labor and capital to
produce other types of goods such as footwear, clothing, electrical machinery,
construction services and the like. This could have helped relieve the pressures from the
IMF and led the country to recover faster. The modernization of Mexico’s industrial
sector and the promotion and diversification of its exports along with the liberalization
of the national economy were the most plausible options open to the Mexico in order to
stabilize its economy. With these fiscal and economic reforms Mexico experienced
economic growth.

Chapter 3:
Mexico and NAFTA
The past two chapters have covered the economic policies that several Mexican
governments have implemented for the development of the country. These polices have
gone through three different periods. First, from a protectionist and regulatory regime
15

to an economy controlled by an international organization such as the IMF. The current
stage of the Mexican economy is one which is associated with pursuit of market-base,
outward-oriented policies, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a treaty that was signed
by Canada, Mexico and the United States and created the world’s largest free trade area,
which now links 450 million people producing $17 trillion worth of goods and services.
It is the largest free trade area and the richest market in the world in terms of combined
GDP. NAFTA’s ultimate goal is to eliminate taxes among the three North American on
all goods is not possible. Moreover, there was an immediate elimination of tariffs on
more than half of Mexican exports and one third of U.S. exports. The rest of the tariffs
were scheduled to be eliminated in the next ten to fifteen years.
It has been argued that Mexico’s main interest in entering NAFTA was not
necessarily to have access to the North American particularly U.S. market. Rather its
main motivation was to provide incentives to increase foreign direct investment (FDI)
in to the country. Although NAFTA has generated economic growth by increasing
Foreign Direct Investment and trade between North America and Mexico, it has also
been limited to the manufacturing sector and unfortunately it has had relatively little
impact on other sectors of the Mexican economy. Structural reforms in the financial,
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energy and other domestic sectors have lagged behind those in the manufacturing
sector over the last few decades.
During president Salina’s government, Mexico was in need of financial
resources. Foreigners did not find it safe to invest in Mexico due to “erratic policy shifts,
‘Mexicanization’ laws, and the bank expropriations.”13 Salina’s reforms failed to
convince domestic and foreign investors to put money into the Mexican economy.
Instead, domestic investors would rather put their money overseas, which hurt the
Mexican economy tremendously. It is estimated that $20 billion dollars of assets owned
by Mexican investors are being held offshore.14 With the increasing outflows of money
and the investors’ low confidence in the Mexican economy, president Salinas decided to
propose the NAFTA in order not only to increase trade, but mainly to regain domestic
and foreign investors’ confidence.
Mexico was considered a great exporter with the exception of agricultural and
textile products. Nevertheless, the Salinas administration realized that by implementing
the free trade agreement investors would be more willing to invest in Mexico so as to
have easier access to the North American markets. Secondly, Mexico “wanted NAFTA
in order to guarantee foreign investors that their property rights would be protected.”15
This was the Salinas administration’s main goal because by protecting investors’ rights
Maurer, 10
Maurer, 10
15 Maurer, 11
13
14

17

he hoped that more capital would flow to Mexico. His goal was to raise Mexican
productivity through foreign investments and by raising the level of competition with
local companies, forcing them indirectly to be more competitive, thus increasing their
productivity and causing the economy to grow as a whole.
Foreigners that invested assets in Mexico after 1994 “did so in order to use
Mexico as an export platform to the United States,” which, in essence, was also part of
Salina’s goal because it would bring FDI into Mexico.16 However, after the peso crash in
1994-95, foreigners were hesitant to invest in non-financial non-export industries. The
foreigners’ motivation to invest only on the export sector is due to the fact that they
earned revenue in dollars compared to the other sectors that earned revenue in Mexican
pesos. Since the peso had been frequently devalued and had recently crashed, it was not
convenient to be earning revenue in pesos. Therefore, it was far less risky for investors
to keep the U.S. dollar as their currency. On the other hand, export industries benefited
when the peso lost value, since their revenue in dollars was not affected and “many of
their costs especially wages dropped in dollar terms.”17 It was painless for the export
sector, they were earning in dollars and spending in pesos, earning on a more expensive
currency and spending on a weaker one.

16
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Wages and Living standards under NAFTA

During the 1980s and the early 1990s, real wages of unskilled workers fell due to
Mexico’s initial trade opening. By 1987, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) that forced the lowering of prices of textiles, furniture, and shoes in
order for these industries to be more competitive among other countries that had joined
the treaty. Lowering of prices brought as a consequence the lowering of wages of the
unskilled labor that worked in the manufacturing sectors mentioned above.
Once NAFTA went into effect, the wage gap between the unskilled and skilled
labor narrowed. This time the “skill-intensive” industries such as automobile and auto
parts companies were the ones most affected by having to lower wages.18 The textile
industry in Mexico was one of the most benefited by NAFTA: it was in high demand
and had a privilege over other countries’ textiles industries. Since this industry was in
high demand the real wages for the textile industry in Mexico rose while wages for the
automobile and auto parts fell. The closing of the wage gap happened in 1994 and 1995.
The economic improvements at the beginning of the 1990s under NAFTA were
not spread evenly throughout Mexico for several reasons. Mexico has a better
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure in the Northern part of its
territory, which in fact contains the better educated population in the area. The
18
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maquiladora industry is also located in northern Mexico along the border with the U.S.
which facilitates the transportation and delivery of goods to the U.S.
On the other hand, the southern part of México has not experienced the
improvements in infrastructure that the North has experienced. In Mexico since “1993,
per capita GDP has fallen at an annual rate of 1 percent in the southern states.”19 One of
the reasons is the South’s specialization in agricultural production and the lack of
entrepreneur companies in the area, in contrast to the north. Another reason is that due
to the distance of Southern Mexico and North America, the North part of Mexico enjoys
a lot more FDI from the United States since its closer and therefore it is easier and faster
to transport goods. As the author Maurer suggests; the Mexican government has to
improve its economic development in the South of its territory to equalize growth, or
else there will be continues migration to the north of México and the United States from
southern states.

The improvements in the North of Mexico took place before China joined the
World Trade Organization (WTO) which is the successor of GATT. China’s entry to the
WTO has drastically influence Mexico’s advantage of trade with North America in the
low skilled sector of the economy. Mexico’s competition increases dramatically with
China on the radar, given the fact that China is known for its massive labor supply, low
19
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production costs and large quantities of production. Therefore, Mexico must change its
economic focus and localize the areas where it can be superior to China and other
competitors to specialize on those sectors. With China as a trade adversary, it is going to
be challenging for Mexico’s unskilled sector to continue to be as profitable as it has been
in the North of México.

Bottlenecks that Mexico faces

There are several bottlenecks that Mexico currently faces. First, in Mexico only
3.3 percent of electricity is privately generated. This is a serious problem since electricity
constitutes a very substantial cost for many of Mexico’s industries. There is an
“increasing demand for electricity in Mexico, in fact, prices have risen 50 percent in the
last five years” and the cost in Northwest Mexico, are now “more than twice the level in
Arizona”.20 Consequently many factories close to the U.S. border are considering
moving their operations to the U.S. This is one more reason that discourages investors
of putting their money in Mexican factories.
Second, the petroleum sector remains nearly completely closed from private
investment. Mexico made the energy and petroleum sectors government’s property
which prohibits private investments and exploration. Private investors “are forbidden
20
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from participating in either drilling or basic refining.”21This consequently has a negative
result on the development of the petroleum sector because it slows down the potential
growth rate of a major booming industry. It has even hurt Mexico to the extent that it
imports petroleum when it has enough quantities of oil to be self-sufficient on
petroleum terms. The government is not doing enough to promote and explode this
industry; it instead is wasting time and not taking advantage of its natural resources to
generate economic growth.
Third, the telecommunications and internet connections’ rates are very high in
Mexico because the government has allowed the company Telmex to create a monopoly
on telecommunications. Other companies have tried to compete with Telmex’s
monopoly and attempted to enter the telecommunications markets but Telmex has been
able to fight out all its competitors. Telmex currently controls two thirds of Mexican
telecommunications and it has expanded to the U.S., Argentina, Colombia Brazil and
other Latin American countries. The result is that “Mexico remains deficient in
telecommunication services, and charges remain high by international standards.”22
Part of this is the government’s fault for allowing one single telecommunication’s firm
to take control of most of the sector, and in addition allowing this company to charge
high prices for a service.

21
22

Maurer, 16
Maurer, 16
22

Fourth, Mexico also suffers a tax-collecting problem; in 2003 Mexico collected 18
percent of its GDP in taxes while the U.S. collected 28 percent. With a population larger
than 150 million people, only 5 percent pay taxes. Moreover the wealthy avoid most of
their tax payments through corrupt transfers, benefiting individually, but hurting the
country’s economy. Others avoid taxes by shopping in the large informal sector that
exists in Mexico. As a result of the low tax income, the Mexican government struggles to
find capital to invest and be able to expand education, health and other social needs of
the populations.
While many blame the government and complain about the low quality of these
services, its both the people’s fault for evading tax payments and the corruption within
the government who keeps much of the tax money collected. As a consequence, Mexico
has seen a decline in its education system due to low investment in public schooling.
“Mexico’s per-student expenditures are only 30 percent of Greece’s, 18 percent of
Japan’s, and 16 percent of the USA’s.” 23 This shows the lack of investment in education
that brings many negative consequences to the Mexican people and the country itself.
Less skilled labor, increase in crime and lower wages for the people among others.
These bottlenecks are some of the reasons for Mexico’s failure on being able to
develop its economy better with the goal to catch up with the first world economies. On
the one hand investment clearly remains below the normal to develop an infrastructure
23
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that can possibly bring economic growth. On the other hand the Mexican government
allows companies such as Telmex to charge absurdly high rates. Instead, the
government should control companies like Telmex in the way they charge to provide
their service and collect more money in tax form to increase government spending and
build a stronger infrastructure that benefits everyone and not just a few. Ironically, the
Mexican government does not allow private companies to invest in Pemex. Private
investment in Pemex can certainly help boost and expand its production, as well as
increase its competitiveness worldwide. Privatization of Pemex can also help reduce
corruption within the firm, and take its production more seriously. Being a government
owned firm, companies often find themselves subject to corruption since the Mexican
government currently has high levels of fraud and dishonesty. The fact that the
government controls Pemex has caused stagnation on the company’s oil search, the
government has become too passive in their domestic oil exploitation to the extent that
they had to import oil from abroad having their own petroleum plants. If Pemex was a
private company it could get loans for oil expeditions, and if a member of the
corporation is not contributing anything to the firm, the company can make quick
changes on their employee force and be more productive under less corruption. Finally
Mexico has clearly failed to collect sufficient tax to build a solid infrastructure able to
spend in education, security and health among other public services.

24

Maquiladoras in the Mexican Economy

As I have mentioned before, most of the FDI went to the manufacture sector,
specifically to the maquiladoras. The maquiladoras are factories usually located in the
northern part of Mexico close to the United States where plants import material,
equipment and capital on a tariff free basis mainly from North America for assembling,
processing and manufacturing goods. The “number of maquilas in Mexico has jumped
from 2000 in 1994 to 3,333 in 1999.”24 Most of the firms in this area are owned by the
U.S. companies “with well-known names such as American Home Products, Beatrice
Foods, Caterpillar, Eastman Kodak, Frito-Lay, Ford, GM, IBM, Levi-Strauss, Mattel,
Motorola, Pepsico, Siemans, Sony, Wrangler, and Maiden form, to name just a few.”25
Once the product is finished it’s shipped out to markets around the world, especially to
the United States under the NAFTA treaty in order to avoid tariffs. Maquiladoras have
a significant contribution to Mexico’s GDP. In 2002, “maquiladora exports made up
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roughly half of all exports. Their production was roughly 17 percent of Mexico’s
GDP.”26
On the other hand, NAFTA has helped Mexico’s economy in its export industry
because most of its goods are consumed by the U.S. However, whenever the U.S.
economy is struggling or going through a recession, Mexico’s economy is deeply
affected since as noted above its exports are a large component of Mexico’s GDP and
the U.S. consumes a little more than ninety percent of these goods. This is evidence by
how “Mexico has been dragged into a severe recession by the faltering U. S. economy in
the past two years.”27 The U.S. recessions in the past decade consequently lead to
hundreds of plant closings in the north of Mexico. In less than a year “240,000
maquiladora workers had lost their jobs, 19% percent of total Maquiladora
employment.”28 This figures show the dependency from Mexico to the U.S economy.
Indeed this dependency can be dangerous for Mexico’s prosperity from two different
views. First, if the U.S. happened to find a market that is more convenient for them and
they decide to stop importing from Mexico. On the other hand if Mexico for some
reason finds itself not producing the goods that the U.S is used to consume then the U.S
will have to look for another exporter.

Mauer, 14
Ramirez (2003), 8
28 Ramirez (2003), 8
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Unfortunately, productivity across the Mexican economy has not grown evenly.
One of the reasons is because domestic and foreign investments have gone primarily to
the manufacturing sector, which constitutes only one fifth of the Mexican economy.
This sector reached its peak in the year 2000 producing 20 percent of Mexico’s GDP;
however it has steadily declined since. In order to increase “domestic investment, the
Mexican government needs to reform energy petroleum, telecoms, tax system,
infrastructure and education, but the country had made very little progress on any of
this fronts.

NAFTA in the present and the emergence of the Chinese economy

The rise of China involves opportunities as well as obstacles for many countries
in south Asia and Latin America. Their abundant low labor cost, prosperous foreign
investments and an increasing skilled labor among other reasons have given them the
opportunity to expand their markets at the expense of others. As a result NAFTA has
been highly affected due to the emergence of China, specifically Mexico since it is
increasingly in competition with Chinese manufactures. Therefore if countries like
Mexico want to rescue their economy they must change their export structure; first by
upgrading the value added of their exports, secondly, by focusing on issues such as

27

distance and time costs that can work for their advantage and lastly implementing a
new and competitive infrastructure with the help of their NAFTA counterparts.
In the paper by Wise, the NAFTA members are compared and contrasted with
one another. She mentions that although Mexico has double the growth of its GDP per
capita from 1995 to 2000, “the rise of real income in Mexico has hit a virtual plateau”29.
Wise says that one of the reasons for this stagnation in the Mexican economy was due to
the lack of success of Mexico to reduce inflation and interest rates that had already been
achieved by its other two NAFTA partners. Canada and the US were engaged in a free
trade agreement implemented in 1989 known as CUSFTA, five years before the North
American free trade agreement would include Mexico. According to Wise, this gave
Canada an advantage compared to Mexico since it had been engaged in free trade with
the US for longer and had settled markets with high demand, such as the commodities
market. However, Canada did not hold to this trading advantage for long.
In few years after the creation of NAFTA, Mexico caught up quickly and
eventually “tripled its GDP outpacing Canada’s improvement. The number of patents
granted to Mexico increased at a faster rate than did those of the US, while Canadian
patents decreased”.30 Without NAFTA Mexico’s “global exports would have been 50
percent lower and foreign direct investment would have been about forty percent
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lower.”31 Clearly, the Mexican economy was benefited by NAFTA. It increased its GDP
per capita every year, it enhanced Mexico’s competitiveness, it increasing its
productivity, it diversified Mexican exports to be less dependent in oil and NAFTA also
increased foreign direct Investment in Mexico. These advancements in the Mexican
economy were significant but certainly not enough, they were unsustainable and they
did not reach the expectations of the NAFTA engineers.

Changes of the Mexican economy under the influence of China
One of the Mexican government’s goals to implement NAFTA was to stimulate
exports of the manufacturing sector. In the early years of NAFTA before China had a
big influence in the U.S. market, Mexico succeeded in attracting FDI in the automotive
and electronics sector. Yet Mexico has failed to maintain the same rate of growth
experienced in the earlier years. Furthermore, not only Mexico but the three countries,
Canada, Mexico and the U. S have been losing ground in the world trade of
manufactures to other economies. In fact since the formation of NAFTA in 1994 to 2000
the three countries were deeply integrated into the manufacturing global market all
three countries increased employment in this sector, “by 8.4% in the region, 1.4 percent
in the U.S., 23.4 percent in Canada, and 39.2 percent in México.“32
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Contrary to the period from 2000 to 2009, where the NAFTA “region together
lost 6.3 million jobs in manufacturing, or 27 percent of total employment in the sector.”33
This signifies that since 2000 to the present the general integration of these three
countries has deteriorated. This situation has only worsened after the global crises of
2008.
Mexico’s economy has struggled since the 1940s with the lack of appropriate
domestic investment reforms. Mexico boosted its economy throughout the late
nineteen’s with FDI but it did not helped set on a base for long-term economic growth.
For example from 1980 to 2007 “Mexico’s per Capita GDP growth rate was one tenth
that of China.”34 Several specific events have strongly affected NAFTA and the
economic relationship between Mexico and North America. Recently, Mexico’s
manufacturing sector has been one of the most affected by the emergence of China. By
the end of 2009 more than half of its labor force went unemployed due to the lack of
demand of Mexican goods throughout the early 2000s and the economic crisis of 2008.
This was also caused by the relocation of maquiladora’s operations to “lower wage
countries in Central America and Asia, particularly China.”35 Secondly the trade
integration between Mexico and the United States has declined steadily. In the
manufacturing sector, the drop has been more evident with Mexico’s “share of U.S.
Gallagher, 28
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manufacturing imports dropping from levels above 80 percent in 1990’s to 45 percent in
November 2008. 36These figures clearly represent the decreasing economic integration
between the two countries. Thirdly, the high dependency on the U.S. trade and
economy affects Mexico both positively and negatively. For example, in the economic
crisis of 2008 the demand for many goods such as automobiles fell tremendously.
Mexico is the largest supplier of auto parts and automobiles for American companies
such as GM, Chrysler and Ford providing more than half of the autos to these
companies. Since the demand for automobiles decline in many countries during the
economic crisis of 2008, Mexico’s auto manufacturing sector was negatively affected
tremendously. Finally the last key issue to fully understand Mexico’s decline in
manufacturing is the emergence of new competitors for the U.S. market. Recently
Mexico drop from being the largest exporter to the U.S to be second after China. The
low cost of Chinese imports have made Mexican imports look expensive and
unattractive for U.S. companies.

Obstacles for Mexico under the rise of China

Wise identifies three obstacles that impede Mexico’s development. The first
obstacles that she identifies are corruption and institutional modernization. The lack of
36
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government effectiveness and political stability clearly affects Mexico’s economic
progress as it makes economic policies harder to execute. It also diverts domestic and
foreign direct investment towards other countries due to the lack of investors’
confidence to invest their assets in an unstable country.
The second obstacle that Wise develops is the divided government in Mexico. In
previous years the executive branch in Mexico had enough power to implement
economic and political policies more handily, nevertheless due to the strengthening of
the legislative power in recent years it has diminished its strict power to conduct
economic policies and therefore left Mexico at a disadvantage in perusing economic
policies such as NAFTA.
The third obstacle that Wise identifies is the idea of geographical proximity.
Mexicans thought they did not have to worry about competition, but in recent years
China has made huge inroads increasing its exports to the US “23 per cent in 2004
versus 3 per cent in 1990.37” Some of the causes of China’s rapid advancement are their
lower cost of production, much greater labor force, more tax incentives, their
investments abroad and their investment in the educational infrastructure “turning out
some 600,000 engineers and thousands of other qualified professionals each year.38”
These are some of the predominant reasons that show China’s solid economic, political
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and social infrastructure that will keep their economy highly competitive and with a
concrete foundation.
Both essays by Lidoy and Hogenboom present substantial evidence of how
China’s trade impact in the world has benefited some countries but has also harmed
others. For example in the essay by Lidoy he mentions that “in 1988, nearly 60% of
United States shoe imports came from South Korea compared to a meager 2% from
China. By 2005 China’s share was more than 70% while United States imports from
South Korea and Taiwan had dwindled.39” This is one of the examples of China’s
impact in the global markets and how it gains territory in foreign markets at expense of
others. After China joined the WTO in 2001 its exports and imports increased
immensely. Between 1990 and 2002 Chinese exports had “increase 425%, this implies,
by definition that other countries are losing market shares” and China is simply
replacing them and making vast profits.40 Chinese goods compete with other emerging
economies in South Asia and in Latin America. Currently any country whose export
structures are similar to that of China is being greatly affected by the rapid expansion of
the cheap and abundant Chinese production of goods; such is the case of Mexico. On
the other hand countries with opposite export structures are more likely to be
benefitting from the emergence of China such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil (to some
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extent). Those countries like Argentina that export mainly commodities face lower
competition, given the fact that China does not export commodities, but rather imports
them, they often find themselves being trading partners and as a consequence
benefitting each other. Chile was one of the countries that highly supported China’s
entry to the WTO because they “aimed to achieve foreign direct investment from China,
particularly to the mining sector”.41 Brazil is another country that has been profiting
from rising commodity exports and Chinese investment. Although in recent years the
trade between China and Brazil has turned a bit hostile since China has persistently
tried to force Brazilian exports to remain fixed, benefiting China and harming Brazil.
China has also increasingly sought for foreign investment abroad in Latin America and
Africa to secure their supply of commodities and other necessary goods for their
economy and production. The development of this solid infrastructure stabilizes and
strengthens their long term economic expansion, securing the supply of resources
necessary for their long-term economic development.
Moreover those countries such as Mexico, that specialize in information and
technology, electronics, clothing and low value added goods will find themselves in
high competition with China. “While 90 percent of the PCs produced in Mexico go to
the US, China is increasingly replacing Mexico in this market”42. Therefore the economic
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approach by all the affected countries such as Mexico must change otherwise China will
soon devastate their markets.

What are the modifications that Mexico and NAFTA have to consider in order to
improve?

For Hogeboom there are three main tasks that Mexico should change. First, he
mentions there should be “regional cooperation and integration in Latin America and
make sure that the returns of the commodity boom are invested in economic
modernization for the long-term” in the countries.43 Similar to what China is doing
securing their long-term economic growth. Secondly there should be a “regional
infrastructure that invests time and money in political, institutional and social
integration” as well as construction of roads and pipelines for a better transportation of
their goods.44 Thirdly, recognize the situation that these countries are facing to be able
to “develop a new model” of their economic strategies. 45 For example Lidoy mentions
that in order for Mexico to become more competitive it should change their export
structure “by upgrading the value added of their exports” to make them more
competitive. Another aspect that Lidoy suggests is that Mexico should focus on those
Hogenboom, 150
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goods where “time costs are both a quantitatively and a quality” important.46 This will
allow Mexican goods to be more competitive and effective than Chinese goods when
exporting them to the US markets. Time costs for the production of certain goods really
matter and if Mexico is more capable of delivering a better good at a faster rate than
China is, then most likely the US will take the Mexican goods. Wise also suggests that in
order for Mexico to be more competitive there has to be a “technological guidance, and
development assistance from its NAFTA partners “to formulate a better infrastructure
for a superior trade with North America. 47 Lidoy, Hogeboom and Wise all suggest that
Mexico should invest “more vigorously in infrastructure, technology transfer” and
work with the US to reduce the time at the border for security checks to reduce the time
costs even more.
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The emergence of the Chinese market as mentioned before is clearly benefitting
but also harming other markets. In order for the disadvantaged countries to overcome
China’s threat they most make the necessary adjustments.

Reforming the Investment policy
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In order for Mexico to aim for long term economic growth it should change its
investment regime. Mexico should promote and protect domestic investment, while
ensuring that foreign investors are not privileged over domestic investors. Make long
term investments that create jobs and help the country develop a sustainable economy.
Moreover, the NAFTA laws should go under review since foreign investors have
shown that they would challenge any government measure that is on their way of
achieving success. For example “NAFTA has to date been used to challenge: measures
to control gasoline content and protect groundwater resources; a legislative ban on the
export of hazardous resources; the creation of an ecological park; the regulation of
open-pit mining near Native American scared sites and most recently the
implementation of safety standards for foreign trucks.”49 NAFTA was created to
encourage investment but many foreign investors have clearly gone out of proportion
with their demands. In other words lawyers have the ability to sue governments for any
situation that investors disagree or are unhappy with. They use NAFTA laws as a way
of protecting their business in case of failure. This is also difficult for the government’s,
since it gives an opportunity to unhappy investors to threaten countries with expensive
fines.
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For these reasons the three countries should come together to make the
appropriate modifications to NAFTA’s laws. Otherwise one of them could be facing a
situation close to the one Argentina is facing. This country has received approximately
46 claims for its reforms in the face of the country’s economic crises of 2001. These
claims brought by foreign companies have cost Argentina billions of dollars and have
had an important impact on its economy. This is an example from which the three
North American countries should learn and take action before it’s too late.
Investment treaties should allow governments to be better protected and be able
to take action against foreign investors that threaten governments with senseless claims.
There should be a balance in the regulation of these laws, one where the governments
does not target and discriminate foreign investors under particular circumstances and
at the same time investors do not bring unnecessary claims. For any kind of disputes,
NAFTA should offer an independent and fair process separate from both the investors
and the country in case consistent with NAFTA laws and principals. Another sector that
needs an urgent change is the manufacture sector or maquiladora industry.
Mexico’s maquiladora industry includes auto parts, medical products,
electronics, and items for aerospace. Scholars have decided to classify the maquilas into
three different types or generations to show the differences between these factories. The
first generation plants perform the simplest assembly tasks. The second generation
plants produce more refined manufacturing products and the third generation utilize
38

technological intensive production to assembly high quality goods. The maquiladoras
are the producers of most of the export that go to the U.S. Before the rise of the Chinese
economy, the U.S imported 90 percent of Mexican exports. In the last decades Chinese
competition has caused a reduction of the maquiladora plan. The difference in
compensation rates is very significant, it is estimated that Chinese labor is one third to
one half cheaper than Mexican labor. Therefore, this represents a problem to the
maquiladora industry since its production is more expensive than in China. From 67 of
the maquilas in Monterrey Mexico only 37 percent of the maquilas survived in 1994.
Few maquilas producing apparel “23 percent, furniture zero percent, or leather zero
percent were still active while 60 percent of the electronics and 68 percent of auto part
producers remained.”50These shocking figures show the influence of Chinese
production and how fast its production is taking over markets of other countries.
Scholars such as Lidoy argue that Mexico should not try to regain low wage
assembly jobs but as an alternative develop the higher value added and technology
intensive sectors. Mexico has already started to develop this sector and many
maquiladoras have already made the transition from the first and second generation to
the third, upgrading its products on the foundations of advanced technology. This shift
has helped saved a few more maquiladoras from losing to the Chinese competition.
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Mexican policy makers argue that by shifting from the first generation production
systems to a higher value added with a more technology intensive model the
maquiladoras have experienced better results in their exports to the U.S. As mentioned
before some goods produced in the maquiladoras such as the auto parts are still great
exports from Mexico that have slightly increased their demand of labor from 2000 to
2005 while maquiladoras specialized in other sectors have completely vanished. Figure
one demonstrates the approach that the Mexican maquiladoras are trying to achieve.
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that China has also targeted high technology
sectors such as the auto parts production, and has seen a profitable opportunity that
they are rapidly developing.

Mexico has found few ways were they can still be ahead of China in their
exports. However, “the rapid increase in Chinese exports to the US, the stagnation
and/or fall in Mexican exports to the US in several of these same sectors, the loss of close
41

to 300,000 maquila jobs from late 2000 to December, 2003, reports of widespread
enterprise migration from Mexico to China, and a growing number of studies from
agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank provide
clear evidence China represents a direct threat to Mexico.”51 Therefore in order to be
successful, Mexico and other countries should focus on sectors where they do not face
Chinese competition directly.
The next graph shows a comparison in the growth rate of the U.S. imports from
China and México in the last two decades. Mexico’s export share to the U.S. is shown in
red while China is represented in green. The United Census Bureau website provides
yearly information of U.S imports from every country in the world among other
information. In the graph we can see that from the 1990 to 2001 there is a noticeable
difference between the two trends. In the year 2002 the U.S. imported 134,600 million
dollars worth of goods from Mexico and 125,100 million dollars worth of goods from
China. By the next year in 2003 China would surpass Mexico while exporting 152,400
million dollars and México 138,000 million dollars worth of exports to the U.S. only. The
graph shows when the two trends merge for a few months and then the Chinese trend
spikes upwardly while the Mexican trend keeps growing but at an evident lower rate.
The next graph also shows that by the end of the year 2011 the Chinese exports to the

51

Sargent, 23
42

U.S were 399,000 million dollars while the Mexican exports were 263,000 million
dollars. China’s exporting rate as of 2011 is one third higher compared to the one from
Mexico.

Chin

Mexic

It is astonishing the way China is substituting for Mexico in the U.S. market. We
have examine different policies that the Mexican government should impose with the
43

manufacturing and transportation sectors. On the other hand there other sectors where
the Mexican government can find a way to improve its situation, perhaps in the
agricultural sector.

Agriculture under NAFTA and proposals for reform

Among these countries agriculture has been a controversial theme and has
affected people particularly in Mexico. Mexico has the advantage of being able to
produce off-season fruits and vegetables and have profitable market selling them to
North America when they are not able to produces these goods. The U.S. also has a vast
agricultural sector. Corn is a good example to demonstrate the emergence of a
successful American product taking over the Mexican domestic production. For
geographical and technological issues, the U.S. is able to produce at least two thirds or
more corn than Mexican producers. After NAFTA was established the high production
of corn in the U.S. quickly swamped the Mexican markets. This caused a drop of more
than “25 percent” in the Mexican agricultural sector, an average of “two million people”
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left the corn fields.”52 The little agriculture that remained in the production of corn
experienced high competitively against the U.S imports and a larger supply of fruits
and vegetables in the Mexican market, hence a drop in prices of more than fifty percent.
As a chain reaction this situation caused agricultures to migrate looking for seasonal
jobs in the U.S. or permanent jobs in other states of Mexico.
It is vital that both governments come together to solve this problem because
people have not been finding jobs and poverty remains high. Mexico has experienced
an increasing food dependency on cheap U.S. foods. It should be unacceptable for a
developing country such as Mexico to be dependent upon other countries on their food
supply; this is supposed to be one of the country’s stronger sectors of the economy
where it should be exporting rather than importing food. If Mexico finds itself
importing food, not being successful in its manufacturing sector, not creating jobs, with
a deficient domestic investment policy, and more issues mentioned previously, México
will struggle in the upcoming decades. The three NAFTA countries should find a way
in which they regulate their exportations between one another in a way that they do not
harm each others’ sectors. NAFTA should be an instrument that helps the three
economies develop and not a system that destroys them.
There are several ways the Mexican government can help develop and at a
certain level protect its agricultural sector. In order to achieve these changes there has to
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be political motivation and the government’s desire to execute adjustments. First of all
the U.S. can “expand its own government support for smallholders, since subsided are
not restricted under NAFTA and Mexico’s current support levels remain billions of
dollars below the county’s allowable limits under NAFTA.”53 Secondly, utilize its
involvement in the “Cartagena protocol on Biosafety” to restrict imports from the
United States because many of them are genetically modified and “Cartagena
recognizes the precautionary principal”.54 This issue is of high importance because
genetically affecting products violates NAFTA’s environmental regime. Thirdly justify
protective tariffs to shield part of the agricultural sector in México specially the
production of corn and beans. In this theme México can bring the issue of constant
illegal migration of Mexicans to the U.S. prompt by the loose of jobs in the agricultural
sector.
To implement changes in the NAFTA reforms the Mexican government should
also relay on organizations such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) which is the
current trade negotiation round of the WTO. Under the DDA, countries are allowed to
implement policies to protect the asymmetries in development between trading
partners. One of the policies is to establish goods under the “special group category
within NAFTA , with clear and agreed criteria for its use consistent with emerging
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WTO Disciplines.” 55 This would by itself concentrate on many issues over the shocks of
NAFTA in the agricultural sector. Currently there was a proposal aimed at developing
countries to declare up to 12 percent of tariff on agricultural products that would fall
under the special product criteria. Many of the Mexican agricultural products especially
corn and beans fall into this criteria, but until 2010 the Mexican government had not
petitioned the WTO for the special products status of its corn and beans production.
In addition of the propositions that the Mexican government could petition for,
they could also relay upon the North American Development Bank (NADBANK) for
public investment. The NADBANK involvement with Mexico has not been
advantageous nor helpful. Mexican “researchers have shown that Mexico could more
than double the country’s maize production using existing technologies if there were
public investment in communications, infrastructure, irrigation, credit and agricultural
extension.”56 Therefore it is critical that Mexico increases its public investment to help
grow the agriculture sector.
On the other hand increasing investment on the corn production, Mexico can
counter the negative agricultural impact that NAFTA has brought by entering a new
international coffee agreement. NAFTA forbids Mexico from exporting its coffee to
other parts of the world. Such measurements should not exist when North America is
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the only one benefiting from the corn exportation to Mexico for instance. As mentioned
before NAFTA should be used to help develop all three economies and by restricting
Mexico’s exportation of coffee Mexico is not developing its coffee sector and its corn
sector is ruined by it so-called trading partner.
Due to this unbalanced trade, there have been social and economic consequences
that have to be addressed. Mexico joined NAFTA with a lack of preparation on its
technology and transportation infrastructures. Therefore it is hard for México to
compete against North America’s production nowadays and day by day it is harder to
close the gap with the other North American economies. If these issues were not
addressed before the implementation of NAFTA they should be addressed now.

What should the three NAFTA countries do?

First and foremost, in order to face the challenges that the three NAFTA counties
are encountering, regional representatives have to get together to work on renewal
reforms for NAFTA. The equal cooperation among the countries is of great importance,
as it was since the establishment of the treaty. It is imperative to begin working on a
framework that strengthens the integration of the regions economically, socially and
ideologically for the same purpose. Secondly they should address their challenges
facing each country’s priority sectors. For instance, from the Mexican standpoint, there
48

are issues with agriculture, energy, transportation, migration, automobile industry and
the financial and banking sectors, among others. Lastly they should concentrate on
ways to enhance commerce and trade among the three countries to get the most profits
out of it. They should attempt to increase trade amongst themselves and find ways to
invest in each other’s economies rather than looking to settle business overseas. This is
an effort to reduce the competiveness vis a vis other countries that might offer tempting
business opportunities to the NAFTA countries. Currently the three countries face
similar situations with Asia and in particular with China. Not only in respect of
increasing Chinese trade and investment, but also in regard of the substantial current
account deficit. Therefore the NAFTA countries should structure reforms that constitute
a new relationship with Asia.
One of the main weak points of NAFTA has been the lack of financing to
develop. There is a financial institution that was establish in 1994 called North
American Development Bank (NADB) governed equally by the United States and
Mexico for the purpose of financing regional projects. This institution still exists but its
command and thrive has significantly reduced. These types of institutions raise
initiatives such as supporting small and medium businesses, as well as the financing of
technology, venture projects and research to improve development. Therefore both
countries should bring more attention to NADB and ensure that it fulfills its duties.
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Conclusion:
This paper has evaluated the economic development of Mexico since the
late 1940s with a much larger focus in the last two decades when NAFAT was
implemented. The evidence shows that even though NAFTA has not been a complete
success, Mexico would have been a lot poorer without entering this treaty and Mexico
would have not been an attractive country for FDI.
However, this analysis clearly shows that Mexico is not the undeniable winner of
NAFTA, contrary to the general view of this treaty. Mexico on the one hand got FDI,
increased trade, exports quadrupled but it certainly did not develop the economic
growth that Mexico needed.
As mentioned before Mexico only grew at a rate of 1.6 percent per year during
the NAFTA period, which is very low compared to the standards of other developing
countries and even compared with its own economic growth. In previous years Mexico
has had an increase of 6 percent in GDP almost four times of the current growth. More
importantly, the economic growth is very slow by the standards Mexico needs for job
creation. This is probably the most shocking result of NAFTA, even in manufacturing
there were only a limited number of jobs created. Employment in “the manufacturing
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sector fell dramatically after the peso crisis, and remains stagnant as we enter the 21st
century.”57
In the agricultural sector the flood of grains and meets coming in from the
United States cost over two million people to lose their jobs. The percentage of people in
the informal sector increased by almost ten percent and the migration to the United
States from Mexico doubled. FDI into Mexico indeed increased, but ironically the
foreign companies came and eliminated many of their domestic counterparts and the
government was not able to fix the imbalances. So while FDI increased, total investment
in Mexico decreased, and it was only 17 percent of Mexico’s GDP. While it has been
argued that a country needs at least a total of 25 percent of GDP in total investment in
order to grow. In contrast, other Asian countries are in the low 30s while China gets 40
percent of GDP total investment. Therefore the free trade agreements between the
countries need to be fixed in order for them to be able to absorb the benefits of foreign
investment and make the economy develop.
There are several reasons why NAFTA has not accomplished what was
expected. First, the increasing domestic and foreign direct investments went directly
towards the manufacturing sector, leaving the rest of the sectors out of funds to
develop. Second, major bottlenecks to future growth were not addressed by the trade
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pact, notably transportation, education, energy, agriculture, manufacturing and the
financial system. Mexico should also address the problem of social inequality. The gap
between the poor and the rich has just widened and it does not seem like it will get
better unless the government intervenes and fixes the sectors where people are losing
jobs. Lastly Mexico should find a way to redistribute wealth among the population
since the money is highly concentrated on the wealthy.
Some specific reforms that need to be changed in the treaty are the following.
First, as mentioned before there should be an independent organization that balances
out the disputes from foreign companies and governments. In the past Mexico has
experienced that the rights of the foreign companies are elevated over the government’s
power and many take advantage of them, bringing governments to a tribunal at the
World Bank that does not have much transparency and foreign companies end up suing
them for millions of dollars.
Second, make foreign investment help the larger economy by joining together
local and foreign companies where workers from both countries work alongside
learning the technics. In this way local engineers can later expand their acquired
knowledge to other local engineers and let the benefits spill over the rest of the
economy. NAFTA does not allow this kind of learning, which does not let local
engineers to spread the new technology and knowledge across the country.
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Third, Mexico should not rely on foreign investment so heavily. It should
encourage domestic investment and set restrictions for domestic investors to avoid
capital outflow. They should form committees that investigate the competitiveness
agenda of manufacturing in the NAFTA region compared to other places in the world.
Committees that are able to decipher the most convenient procedure for the three
countries. One example of this investigation can be whether or not to allow more
companies such as Pemex to go private to allow them to develop on their own. On the
other hand this committees should also create some restrictions or boundaries in case
they allow companies like Pemex to go private, or in the case of current private
companies such as Telmex to make sure they do not create monopolies that can harm
the population and their basic needs.
Although this paper examines economic policies implemented in the past, it is of
extreme importance to address the current challenge that Mexico is facing with NAFTA.

Mexico’s exports were worth 31, 540 Million USD in March of
2012. Mexico is the biggest exporter in Latin America. Mexico’s major
exports are: manufactured goods, oil and oil products, silver, fruits,
vegetables, coffee and cotton. Mexican trade is fully integrated with that of
its North American partners: 82% of Mexican exports are with the United
States.58
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The fact that the exports as a percent of GDP in Mexico comprise “26.6 %” of
Mexico’s total GDP as of 2009 is alarming. 59 More than four fifths of Mexican exports go
to the United States only, and more than one forth of the Mexican economy is
comprised by its exports. This is exactly the reason why it is imperative and urgent to
address the problems that NFTA is facing. Otherwise, a large piece of wealth will be
lost by Mexico and overtaken by China. Approximately 22 percent of Mexico’s total
GDP could be lost if Mexico and its NAFTA partners do not compromise and come to
an agreement.
Moreover, as mentioned before, Mexico should stabilize its government, which
will enhance production, and increase safety to attract FDI. Mexico should pursue an
economic infrastructure with better highways and transportation that will benefit trade,
making it easier to transport goods. In addition, as mentioned in the beginning of this
thesis, Mexico must work alongside with its NAFTA counterparts to come to
agreements that will benefit all three nations. For instance, the border control between
the U.S. and Mexico must develop faster and more effective security checks . This will
convey a more effective trade in less time from which both countries benefit. These are
some of the situations that countries like Mexico should address as soon as possible
before it is too late to shift to a new economic model of development. If Mexico fails to
59
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tackle these issues soon enough, the country’s political, social and economic situation
will be in danger.
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